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W hen the Justice and Develop-ment Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi, AKP) government a few months ago 
announced its intention of introducing a 
“democratic opening”, it was generally per-
ceived that it would involve mainly the reso-
lution of Turkey’s Kurdish problem through 
peaceful and democratic means. In the follow-
ing months, it became increasingly clear that 
while the Kurdish question remains at the cen-
ter of the opening, as it should, the iniative will 
have other components, such as improving the 
status of the Alevis and the non-Muslim reli-
gious communities. 
The Venice Commission of the Council of 
Europe (the European Commission for De-
mocracy through Law) adopted an opinion at 
its March 12-13, 2010 meeting precisely on the 
last point. The Commission prepared its report 
at the request of the Monitoring Committee of 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
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This article deals with a recent 
opinion adopted by the Venice 
Commission at its meeting onMarch 
12-13 concerning the legal status of 
non-Muslim religious communities 
in Turkey and the right of the 
Orthodox Patriarchate of Istanbul 
to use the title “ecumenical.” On 
the first issue the Commission 
points out the difficulties that arise 
from the lack of legal personality 
for such communities, especially 
in matters related to access to 
courts and property ownership. 
The Commission urges Turkish 
authorities to attend to this problem 
by choosing from the many models 
of legal personality for religious 
groups practiced in European 
countries. On the second point, 
the Commission observes that 
the title ecumenical is a spiritual 
and ecclesiastical matter, and 
not a legal one. It concludes that 
unless Turkish authorities actively 
interfere with the use of such title by 
the Patriarchate, the simple refusal 
of the use of this title by Turkish 
authorities does not amount to a 
breach of the European Convention 
on Human Rights.
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Europe (PACE), which asked it “to assess the compatibility with European stan-
dards of the lack of legal personality for the religious communities in Turkey and 
examine, in this context, in particular the question of the right of the Greek Or-
thodox Patriarchate of Istanbul to use the adjective ‘Ecumenical’.” The Commis-
sion’s opinion is entitled the “Opinion on the Legal Status of Religious Communi-
ties in Turkey and the Right of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Istanbul to Use the 
Adjective ‘Ecumenical’.1” The word “non-Muslim” in the draft was deleted in the 
plenary, since many of the observations and suggestions in the opinion are also 
relevant for Muslim religious communities, especially for the Alevi communities. 
The opinion was adopted by consensus at the plenary.
The Question of Legal Personality
As is clear from the title, the opinion is divided into two main parts. One part 
analyzes the problems caused by the lack of legal personality for religious com-
munities, and the second part discusses the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate’s claim 
to use the title “ecumenical.” A third and last section deals with the question of 
the Halki (Heybeliada) seminary, which, while not mentioned in the Monitoring 
Committee’s request, was found by the Commission to be a relevant issue since it 
is an important element of the freedom of religion.
Regarding the lack of legal personality, the report quotes several decisions 
by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in which the Court correctly 
stressed that freedom of religion is not merely an individual right but also has a 
collective dimension. Consequently, Article 9 of the Euorepean Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) on freedom of religion should be interpreted in conjuc-
tion with Article 11 on freedom of association. Thus, the ECtHR stated in the 
cases of Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria (October 26, 2000) and the Metropolitan 
Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova (December 13, 2001) that
… Article 9 must be interpreted in the light of Article 11 of the Convention, which 
safeguards associative life against unjustified State interference. Seen in that perspec-
tive, the right of believers to freedom of religion, which includes the right to manifest 
one’s religion in community with others, encompasses the expectation that believers 
will be allowed to associate freely, without arbitrary state intervention. Indeed, the au-
tonomous existence of religious communities is indispensable for pluralism in a demo-
cratic society and is thus an issue at the very heart of the protection which Article 9 
affords... In addition, one of the means of exercising the right to manifest one’s religion, 
especially for a religious community, in its collective dimension, is the possibility of en-
suring judicial protection of the community, its members and its assets, so that Article 
9 must be seen not only in the light of Article 11, but also in the light of Article 6.
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Although the ECtHR did not spe-
cifically refer to the question of legal 
personality as such in its ruling quoted 
above, the reference to “the possibility of 
ensuring judicial protection of the com-
munity, its members and its assets” can 
be seen as an endorsement of the need 
for such personality, since this seems to 
be the most effective way of ensuring judicial protection. However, as the Venice 
Commission report correctly states, there is no single European model in this 
regard. In England and some Scandinavian countries, there is an established state 
church that is “legally seen more or less as part of the state itself.” The Turkish 
system is in some ways comparable to this system, as the Presidency of Religious 
Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) that serves the interests of the dominant Sunni 
majority is part of the public administration and its public status is recognized in 
the Constitution (Art. 136). However, the Diyanet does not have a legal personal-
ity of its own and is attached to the office of the prime minister, and the strictly 
secular Turkish Constitution does not, of course, recognize a state religion. Apart 
from the state-church model which, however, offers other minority religious 
communities effective legal protection, there are several other models in Europe. 
In Germany and other “countries close to the German legal tradition… religious 
communities are offered the possibility to apply for special public law status given 
that they fulfill certain criteria, and they can then exercise certain public func-
tions” (para. 19).
In others, religious communities are offered “the possibility to register as a spe-
cial form of private law entity. One example is the French institution of association 
cultuelle” (para. 20). Finally, in some countries “there is no special legislation for 
the legal status of religious communities, and they have to resort to the ordinary 
rules on registering various forms of associations. An example is England with re-
spect to those communities which do not have the status of a state church. English 
law provides, however, to such communities the possibility to register as charities. 
While registration as charity does not provide legal personality, it brings other 
benefits and seems to satisfy the practical needs of religious communities within 
the British Common Law system” (para. 21).
With regard to the situation in Turkey where religious communities as such do 
not have legal personality and they have to represent their interests only through 
foundations and associations established by their members, the lack of legal per-
sonality has been mentioned in a number of Council of Europe documents. Thus, 
The Venice Commission notes 
that “the basic problem in 
Turkish law as regards religious 
communities is that they 
cannot register and obtain legal 
personality as such
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the PACE, in its resolution 1704 adopted 
on January 17, 2010, urged the Turkish 
authorities to “recognise the legal per-
sonality of the Ecumenical Orthodox 
Patriarchate in Istanbul,” as well as the 
other Christian church organizations 
and the Chief Rabbinate, and stated that 
“the absence of legal personality… affects all the communities concerned hav-
ing direct effects in terms of ownership rights and property management” (para. 
24). Similar comments were made by the Commissioner for Human Rights of 
the Council of Europe in his report of October 1, 2009, as well as by the EU 
Commission’s 2008 and 2009 progress reports (paras. 25-27). Based on the 2009 
progress report, the European Parliament on February 10, 2010 passed a resolu-
tion stating, inter alia, that while it “welcomes the implementation of the Law on 
Foundations; regrets, however, that the religious communities continue to face 
property problems not addressed by that law, concerning properties seized and 
sold to third parties or properties of foundations merged before the new legisla-
tion was adopted; urges the Turkish Government to address this issue without 
delay” (para. 28).
The Venice Commission notes that “the basic problem in Turkish law as re-
gards religious communities is that they cannot register and obtain legal person-
ality as such… Instead they have to operate indirectly through foundations or as-
sociations.” As regards the prevailing opinion of the Turkish authorities and “most 
of the legal community,” to the effect that Turkey’s secular legal system does not 
allow such recognition of legal personality, the Commission responds that this is 
based “on a particular interpretations” of the constitutional provisions on secular-
ism: “There are many secular states in Europe that provide religious communities 
with a legal framework for registering… Rather, the interpretation of the Turkish 
Constitution on this point can only be understood in light of the particular un-
derstanding of ‘secularism’ in Turkey, which is unlike that of any other European 
country and which it would probably require both constitutional change and a 
profound change of mentality to alter” (paras. 32, 33).
The Venice Commission makes a positive note about the improvements 
brought about by the 2008 Law on Foundations and the 2004 Law on Associations, 
while pointing out some remaining problems, such as “access to court, employ-
ment rights and the right to train and educate clergy. As regards access to court, 
it appears that the non-Muslim communities as such do not have this, and that 
their only alternatives are to go through the foundations (for property disputes), 
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That if non-Muslim religious 
communities are granted legal 
personality, Muslim religious 
communities should also 
benefit from this possibility
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or to appear in the name of the church leaders or members, as private citizens. As 
for the right to provide religious education – and in particular to train clergy – it 
would appear that it is also negatively affected by the fact that the churches do not 
have legal personality as such” (para. 46).
The Venice Commission then proceeds to examine whether the current situa-
tion in Turkey amounts to a breach of the Convention (ECHR), and answers the 
question in the affirmative: “The Venice Commission … concludes that on the 
basis of the case law of the ECtHR, there seems no doubt that the present Turk-
ish system of not providing non-Muslim religious communities as such with the 
possibility to obtain legal personality amounts to an interference with the rights of 
these communities under Article 9 in conjunction with Article 11 [of the] ECHR” 
(para. 58). The Commission based its argument on various rulings of the ECtHR 
which stated that “to establish a legal entity in order to act collectively in a field of 
mutual interest” is one of the most important aspects of freedom of association, 
without which that right “would be deprived of any meaning” (para. 55).
In the light of this opinion, the case law of the ECtHR on which it is based, 
and the insistent urgings of the Council of Europe and the EU authorities in 
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this regard as mentioned above, it ap-
pears that the the Turkish government is 
well advised to introduce some reforms 
to improve the legal status of religious 
communities. However, even if we dis-
miss the counter arguments based on 
the principle of secularism, as we should, 
there remain some technical difficulties. The current Turkish legal system recog-
nizes only two types of private legal personality, namely associations and founda-
tions, both of which are presently available to religious communities. However, 
one may concur with the opinion of the Venice Commission that neither solution 
fully meets the needs of religious communities especially as regards access to 
courts and the protection of property rights. To grant them public legal person-
ality as some European countries do, on the other hand, would be much more 
problematic given the strictly secularist character of the Turkish constitutional 
system. Besides, such a solution would most likely not be favored by the religious 
communities themselves, since it would be tantamount to making them a part of 
public administration which, in turn, would entail the exercise of tutelary state 
control over them.
Another difficulty derives from the fact that the lack of legal personality is a 
problem not only for non-Muslim communities, but also for many Muslim com-
munities as well, especially for the heterodox Alevi community who rightly claims 
that its interests are not properly served by the Sunni-dominated Diyanet. To 
make things even more complicated, Alevis are divided into various sub-groups 
(presently operating as foundations or associations) with significantly divergent 
views on the nature of Alevism. Similarly, many Sunni religious groups that oper-
ate either as officially unrecognized orders (tarikat) or communities (cemaat), or 
as associations and foundations, may not be happy with the official, individual-
ized version of Islam propagated by the Diyanet. Therefore, even if granting reli-
gious communities (Muslim and non-Muslim alike) legal personality is accepted 
in principle, the practical problem of where to draw the line will still persist. Per-
haps the most realistic and feasible approach would be to develop a system along 
the lines of the French model of “association cultuelle.” This can be done either by 
adopting a special law, or by adding a new chapter to the Law of Associations, with 
due regard to their special characteristics. Obviously, rules governing ordinary as-
sociations cannot be applied in toto to religious community associations, because 
of the special nature of the latter. In developing such a system, the Venice Com-
mission recognizes that the Turkish authorities can choose from various models: 
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the patriarchate is first and  
foremost a spiritual and 
ecclesiastical matter – not a 
legal one
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Halki Seminary functioned 
freely during the Republican 
period until 1971 when the 
Constitutional Court found 
university-level private schools 
unconstitutional
“The Venice Commission… encourages 
the Turkish authorities to continue the 
reform process and introduce legislation 
making it possible for all non-Muslim 
religious communities as such to acquire 
legal personality. There are many models 
in Europe how to do this and the Turkish 
authorities are free to choose the model 
they consider most suitable for the situation in their country as long as it is in 
full compliance with the requirements of the European Convention on Human 
Rights” (para. 109). As for Muslim religious communities, the report notes that 
for the mainstream Sunni Muslim community, “the Diyanet model takes care 
of the basic issue of legal representation,” but raises the question whether this 
“organisation is representative of those groups not belonging to the mainstream 
Sunni belief, and thus whether it is sufficient to guarantee their religious freedom.” 
The Commission feels, however, that “this is a question which falls outside the 
scope of this opinion” (para. 48). It is clear, on the other hand, that if non-Muslim 
religious communities are granted legal personality, Muslim religious communi-
ties should also benefit from this possibility.
With regard to possible restrictions on the granting of legal personality to a re-
ligious community, the Venice Comission quotes the rulings of the ECtHR which 
stated that “the list of exceptions to freedom of religion and assembly, as contained 
in Articles 9 and 11 of the Convention is exhaustive, they must be construed 
strictly and only convincing and compelling reasons can justify restrictions. The 
States have only a limited margin of appreciation in these matters” (para. 62). The 
Venice Commission concurs, stating that “the state may interfere if the religion 
concerned is an extremely fundamentalist one, if it has certain goals which threat-
en State security or public safety, in particular if it does not respect the principles 
of a democratic State, or infringe upon the rights and freedoms of its adherents. 
However, State authorities may not determine themselves whether the religion 
concerned is a sincere and appropriate one, and interpret its beliefs and goals; the 
right to freedom of religion excludes assessment by the State of the legitimacy of 
religious beliefs” (paras. 63, 64).
Finally, the Venice Commission notes that the current situation in Turkey con-
stitutes an interference not only in the freedom of religion and freedom of associa-
tion, but also in the right to a fair trial protected by Article 6 of the Convention: 
“As a consequence of their lack of legal personality, religious communities in Tur-
key cannot access the court system as such, but only indirectly through founda-
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tions acting on their behalf or by the members of the community acting as private 
citizens. This clearly falls short of the requirements of the ECHR as expressed in a 
number of cases” (para. 68).
The Right of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Istanbul to Use the 
Adjective “Ecumenical”
With regard to this question, the opinion correctly states that “the ecumeni-
cal nature of the patriarchate is … first and foremost a spiritual and ecclesiastical 
matter – not a legal one.” However, it points to a 2007 judgement of the Court of 
Cassation which stated that “the Patriarchate is an institution which bears only 
religious powers as the church of the Greek minority in Turkey,” and that there is 
no legal basis for the claim that the patriarchate is “Ecumenical.” The opinion then 
goes on to say that “this denial of the title ‘ecumenical’ by the authorities consti-
tutes an interference with the autonomy of the religious freedom of the Orthodox 
community. Freedom of religion includes certain autonomy on the side of the re-
ligious community to decide on its own organisation, such as questions of internal 
structure, designating religious leaders, the election and education of the clergy, 
and not the least the official denomination of a religious group… Whenever a 
State decides to interfere with these ‘internal’ aspects of organisation of a religious 
group it interferes with its ‘autonomy’ and therefore with the rights under Article 
9 of the Convention” (paras. 84, 86, 87).
However, the Commission observes in the following paragraphs that it had 
no evidence that the Turkish government actively interfered with the right of the 
Patriarchate to call itself “ecumenical.” It is stated that “the Commission has seen 
no evidence or heard no claim to the effect that the Turkish authorities are directly 
trying to stop the Patriarch from using the title ecumenical. There does not seem 
to be any prosecution of him or his followers or any others for using the title. 
Furthermore, there seems to be no direct attempt at trying to stop him exercising 
his ecumenical functions” (para. 90). In the absence of such active interference by 
the Turkish authorities, their simple refusal of using that title does not, of course, 
amount to a breach of the Convention. The 2007 decision of the Court of Cassa-
tion cannot be considered an instance of such active interference, since its state-
ments quoted above have no direct relevance to the judgement, and therefore can 
be dismissed as mere “obiter dictum” with no binding legal force. As the opinion 
correctly states, “no secular court has any competence or jurisdiction to rule on 
whether a religious leader is ecumenical or not. The Patriarchate is neither more 
or less ecumenical as a result of the judgement” (para. 92). The Commission then 
discusses whether there are any provisions in the Lausanne Treaty impeding the 
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use of the title ecumenical and concludes that “1923 Treaty of Lausanne… in no 
way limits the right of the Patriarchate to use the title ‘ecumenical’” (paras. 94-98). 
The Commission’s overall conclusion regarding this issue is as follows:
The Turkish authorities are under a clear obligation under Article 9 of the ECHR not 
to obstruct or in any way hinder the Patriarchate from using this title. However, it can-
not be inferred from the ECHR that the Turkish authorities are obliged themselves to 
actively use this title when referring to the Patriarchate, nor to formally recognise it. If 
the authorities do not want to use this title, they are formally free under the ECHR to 
do so, as long as they do not obstruct the use of it by others. However, taking into ac-
count the fact that the word ‘Ecumenical’ forms part of the title of the Patriarchate and 
has done so since the 6th century, and that this title is widely recognised and used glob-
ally, the Venice Commission fails to see any reason, factual or legal, for the authorities 
not to address the Ecumenical Patriarchate by its historical and generally recognised 
title (paras. 99, 100).
The Halki (Heybeliada) Seminary
Although the status of the Halki Seminary was not among the questions di-
rected to the Venice Commission by the Monitoring Committee of the PACE, 
the Commission decided to include some comments on the question, because 
of its relevance to freedom of religion in general. In this regard, the Commission 
stressed that “the possibility of educating clergy is a core element of freedom of 
religion, and that any obstruction to this by national authorities may amount to a 
violation of Article 9 of the ECHR, and also potentially of the right to education 
as protected by Article 2 of Protocol No. 1” (para. 104).
As I have written elsewhere2 it is very difficult not to agree with the Venice 
Commission’s opinion in this regard. For a religious community, the right to edu-
cate and train its clergy is an indispensable element of freedom of religion. With-
out it, that religious community will be condemned to a slow death. Turkey is 
obliged both under the Treaty of Laussanne that explicitly recognized freedom of 
religion and certain other rights for the three major non-Muslim religious minor-
ities, and also under Article 24 of its own constitution, which guaranteed freedom 
of religion for everybody, to solve this problem. The origins of the Halki Seminary 
go back to the Ottoman times, and it also functioned freely during the Republican 
period until 1971 when the Constitutional Court found university-level private 
schools unconstitutional. Until then, no points were raised concerning the in-
compatibility of its status with Turkish laws. It is, therefore, impossible to under-
stand the reluctance of successive Turkish governments to remedy this situation. 
Excuses given are either of a highly technical nature that can easily be overcome, 
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or based on the considerations of reci-
procity between Turkey and Greece. The 
latter should in no way be an excuse for 
not granting a section of Turkish citizens 
their constitutional rights. Furthermore, 
such a reform should not be limited to 
the three main non-Muslim communi-
ties recognized by the Treaty of Lau-
sanne, but should also cover the Syriac 
and Alevi communities that are not protected by it, and have suffered from the 
lack of such judicial protection.
In conclusion, one may say that improving the legal status of non-Muslim re-
ligious communities in Turkey will bolster the domestic and international cred-
ibility of the AKP government’s democratic opening. It will also significantly im-
prove Turkey’s image internationally. The first, and long overdue, step would be 
the reopening of the Halki seminary without delay.
Endnotes
1. http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2010/CDL-AD(2010)005-e.asp
2. Ergun Özbudun, “Rumlara Heybeliada Çarmıhı,” Star-Açık Görüş, January 3, 2010.
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